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ABSTRACT 
If the combined retirement income, provided by public and private defined contribution (DC) 
pension schemes, falls below socially acceptable standards, there is a political risk that 
consensus seeker policymakers could yield to pressures to commit future fiscal revenues. 
These contingent liabilities, when incorporated in markets’ expectations, are  bound to create 
spillovers on sovereign risk, with negative feedback loops on the capital adequacy of banks 
and of other intermediaries, owing to losses on their government paper. Among the causes of 
reduced annuities out of the final assets in DC pension funds is an equity risk premium much 
lower than the commonly values advertised by the industry and by policymakers. From a 
macroprudential perspective, this political risk should be taken into account in stress tests 
assessing banks’ resilience to financial shocks.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
From a macroprudential perspective, stress tests, aimed at assessing the resilience of  
bank systems facing macrofinancial risks (Greenlaw et al. 2011), should include, at least 
conceptually, the direct and indirect effects of public and private pension schemes on 
financial stability. These effects have in fact a bearing on the capital adequacy of banks and 
other financial institutions, because the political risk of increases in fiscal outlays, to avoid 
that retirement income falls below a socially acceptable level, is bound to affect sovereign 
risk. Political risk is here defined as the risk that policymakers, to gain the consensus of the 
electorate, yield to pressures to  modify ex post the rules underlying the functioning of 
pension schemes – criteria of eligibility to benefits, prudential portfolio allocation rules -, and 
commit debt-financed fiscal outlays or legislate to shift retirement savings from funded 
private schemes to public pay-as-you go (PAYG) systems (as indeed happened in Argentina 
and in East-European countries in recent years; EIOPA 2011).  
Political risk so defined does not include the insurer’s risk of a State selling protection 
to Defined Benefit (DC) private pension schemes that guarantee predetermined returns on 
subscribers’ investment, as proposed for instance in Grande and Visco (2010). 
The main arguments advanced in this paper to back up the claim of the rising 
importance of this specific political risk and of the feedback loops with sovereign risk are 
four. 
First, a standard dynamic inconsistency argument. Ex ante financial sustainability of 
PAYG  notional DC public pension schemes and of DC private pension funds is not per se  
sufficient to avoid likely requests of remedial fiscal outlays when retirement income turns out 
to be too low for socially accepted “subsistence wages”. Replacement rates for PAYG 
notional DC public pension schemes, that is the post-retirement income, expressed as a 
percentage of a worker’s pre-retirement income, are projected to fall in next decades, even for 
full career workers (Grech 2010 for EU countries). Moreover, the starting point of these 
projections is a  condition of  financial fragility for people in retiring age. In the EU-15, for 
instance, the elderly (65+) have a higher risk-of-poverty rate – below 60% of median 
equivalised income after social transfers - than both children and working age population 
(20% against respectively 18% and 15% between 2005 and 2008); EPC-SPC-EC (2010). In 
Italy, with a reformed public pension system broadly endorsed by the EU Commission for its 




out of public notional DC pension schemes, under the best assumption of regular 
contributions on average work income during the standard 35-40 years long working full 
career, decreases from 82 per cent in 2010 to 71 in 2060; it falls from 95 to 57 per cent for  
self-employed ones (MEF 2011). As for DC private pension funds in the Australian 
experience, ’there are a number of groups with relatively low levels of superannuation who 
need further assistance and encouragement to save if they are to achieve even a modest 
standard of living in retirement‘ (Clare 2008, quoted in Wise and Ntalianis 2011, p. 19).  
Second, large defined benefit (DB) or hybrid (with predetermined or guaranteed 
returns) private pension funds create in some countries a potential too-big-to-fail issue, given 
the size of their (negotiable) assets relative to domestic financial markets. A potential 
recourse to public funds  boosts central government contingent liabilities and therefore affects 
negatively sovereign risk, with direct and indirect spillovers on banks’ financial stability, via 
their holdings of “safe” – and hence with low or even null regulatory capital requirements - 
government bonds, as well as funding costs (CGFS 2011a, b). 
Third, private DC pension funds can originate contingent liabilities, because of the 
waning “risk free” status associated with government bonds of advanced countries and of the 
reduced equity risk premium even for long holding periods, at least  on data for the last thirty 
years. One likely consequence of these findings is that young workers will be discouraged 
from the membership in private pension funds, unless tax benefits overwhelm participation 
costs and psychological ones, such as the rules on age before being eligible to benefit of 
accumulated contractual savings. On both accounts, political risks of contingent liabilities 
increase: an insufficient lifetime contribution to the second pillar of the pension system, 
following the taxonomy of World Bank (1994), is bound to generate a reduced retirement 
income on top of the public one; tax expenditures to incentive membership mean lower fiscal 
revenues.  
Fourth, to counteract an already unsustainable public debt to GDP dynamics, 
especially for most advanced States after the economic crisis sarted in 2007 (IMF 2011), 
private DC pension funds may be pressured, or even legislated, especially when they are in 
the accumulation phase, to finance long term investment projects, in order to boost home 
country’s growth. The ensuing potential reduced returns could be invoked to justify 
compensatory public funds, with the aim of guaranteing at least the same final asset, to be 




Paragraphs II-V expand the four arguments; paragraph VI draws some implications on 
financial education and on stress exercises from a macroprudential perspective; paragraph 
VII concludes.  
II. FINANCIALLY SUSTAINABLE BUT UNSUSTAINABLE DC PENSION 
FUNDS  
A DC private pension scheme is by definition financially sustainable, because the 
final asset, including the returns on contributor’s (and his employer’s, for an employee) 
investments, is actuarially equivalent to the present value of annuities over the expected 
retirement period. A PAYG pension scheme, like the ones introduced in Sweden and Italy in 
the Nineties and in Poland in 2003, is financially sustainable because it mimics a DC private 
pension scheme, but only up to a point. The key difference  is that financial sustainability is 
compromised if the contractual return rate, which is not a market one, but is determined by a 
law provision, is unrelated to the  effective GDP per capita growth, which is the basic 
determinant of the contributing capacity of active workers. In addition, annuities can be 
computed with lagged data for life expectancy, disregarding the likely upwards trend (for the 
Italian case, see COVIP 2011).  
The key characteristic of funded private DC schemes, namely the transfer of financial 
risk on subscribers, may result in a retirement income, computed given the market value of 
accumulated contributions in the final year, below socially acceptable standards, even under 
the assumption of universal membership of active workers in non mandatory schemes1. The 
causes can be manifold: a shortened contribution period and/or low  contributions, because of 
a late employment and/or an early exit from the labor market and/or a working career with 
several discontinuities.  In addition, the assumption of an universal participation of all active 
workers is far stretched in non mandatory schemes, especially for the younger ones facing a 
projected shrinking replacement rate out of the first (public) pillar. For instance, in Italy, the 
coverage is of only 23% of workers in 2010; the percentage falls however to 17% for 35-
                                                            
1 Within the 34 OECD countries, nearly half have some type of mandatory private pension arrangement, mainly 
of the defined contribution type. Among the countries with mandatory and quasi-mandatory private DC schemes 





years old or younger workers (COVIP 2011)2. Among the causes of a low coverage are 
liquidity constraints, low financial education, meagre returns in financial markets in recent 
years.  In Italy, since they were instituted in 1999 and up to 2010, the occupational pension 
funds and open pension funds have achieved average annual returns (net of management fees 
and taxes) of 3.1 and 2.3 per cent respectively, almost a half of the average return on 
government bonds; Bank of Italy 2011).  
The implied low replacement rate, out of public and private pension schemes, 
undermines the credibility of a no-recourse to public finances because of the ex ante financial 
sustainability of DC private and of notional DC public schemes.  Both public and private (but 
legislatively mandated and tax-incentived)  schemes are in fact liable to a political risk - a 
textbook case of dynamic inconsistency - when consensus seeking overwhelms financial 
stability in the utility function of short-sighted policymakers. As put by Grech (2010, p. 2): 
’There is an increasing risk that if the pension system does not fulfill public expectations, 
and/or older people find that they did not make appropriate saving and working decisions, the 
State could be forced by voters to reverse reforms and spend more on social transfers‘. 
III. PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS AS LARGE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
Assets of private defined benefit (DB) pension funds are larger than annual GDP in 
countries such as Norway or the Netherlands, or close to a half of GDP in countries such as 
the UK, the USA and Ireland.  Assets of combined DB and DC private pension funds are 
above 60% of GDP and one sixth of total financial system assets also in Australia and 
Switzerland (CGFS 2011b, Graph 1 and Table 2).  
Large DB pension funds, with tens of thousands eligible pensioners, are bound to 
raise expectations  of public money infusions in case their obligations could not be fulfilled. 
A too-big-to-fail syndrome, especially when sponsoring firms are financially weak and 
cannot be further squeezed, to avoid fire sales of funds’ assets with procyclical effects, is 
likely to lead to expectations of public subsidies.  
Similar too-big-to-fail issues emerge for DC pension funds, especially when they 
offer hybrid or guaranteed returns investment options. Indeed, the authorities can be expected 
                                                            
2 These estimates are actually upward biased, because the numerator includes all pension plans, even if a single 




to provide a backstop to either DB or DC large pension funds, in order to let these long term 
institutional investors act as contrarians, when sellers’ herding increases liquidity risks in 
financial markets.  
In turn, political risks embedded in pension schemes, because of contingent liabilities 
for central government, impact directly on pension funds’ expected returns, through the 
valuation channel of public and – via rating downgrade cascades - corporate bond holdings. 
Valuation effects on government bonds are particularly important because of the usual home 
bias for investment in domestic government bonds, be it customary and/or regulatory 
induced.  Doubts, after the subprime and the euro crises, on the risk free status of government 
bonds issued even by USA in the dollar area3 and Germany in the euro area – AAA,  stable 
outlook,  in the Standard&Poor’s rating metrics - impairs one of the underpinnings of a life-
cycle portfolio allocation for pension savings, namely a stable classification of financial 
instruments by risk. In fact, according to a life cycle  rule of thumb, the portfolio share in low 
risk government bonds should rise with working age, in order to gradually dampen returns 
volatility while approaching the exit from the labour market. These very recent developments 
amplify the effects  of the likely reduced regulatory role of bond ratings, embedded in all 
financial reforms enacted o proposed after the subprime crisis, in the USA (Dodd-Frank Act) 
and in the EU (following the recommendations in De Laroisière 2009). The end result is to 
question  entrenched market practices that have relied on the widely held assumption of a 
“safe” bucket of investment grade bonds,  where safe often meant that fund managers felt 
entitled to exempt themselves from the task of a close examination of the credit risk 
embedded in the securities they bought.  
Overall, the financial risk borne by individuals when they become members of a 
private DC scheme and  choose  an investment option fitting their risk profile is bound to 
increase if the risk characteristics of  key instruments such as government and corporate 
bonds become blurred, thus causing a likely greater reliance on public support when the 
effective annuities are determined. Moreover, a higher political risk creates a negative 
feedback loop with sovereign risk, should the attempt to protect from the latter reduce the 
willingness to subscribe government bonds. The consequent higher State funding costs would 
in fact worsen public debt sustainability conditions. 
                                                            





IV. EQUITY RISK PREMIUM AND PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS 
The main rationale, assumed as a unquestioned background fact in the financial 
literacy literature (for a recent example, van Rooij et al. 2011), to advocate the membership 
of a private DC pension fund is the opportunity of earning the equity risk premium, defined 
as the difference between the total return rates of a stock market index and of a market index 
of government bonds, thanks to the reduction of participation costs to equity markets for an 
individual worker  (Guiso et al. 2002). The equity risk premium prices the risk of  a 
comparatively higher volatility of equity returns. Indeed, the annualized realized equity risk 
premia relative to long term domestic government bonds  were equal to 4.5 percentage points 
in the USA and 3.9 in the UK over the period 1900-2010; the standard deviations were on 
average for 19 countries, during the period 1900-2010, almost twice for equities compared to 
bonds (Dimson et al. 2011). Another key stylized fact is that, in the USA, a positive 
annualized real return rate on equities is associated with an holding period of at least twenty 
years  (Dimson et al. 2002)4. These historical findings provide the underpinnings for the 
widely held assumption in the industry, and explicitly laid out also in policy papers5, that 
participating to private pension funds helps an individual to exploit the equity risk premium, 
because his investment horizon as a future pensioner is far longer than the minimum required 
holding period to earn positive real returns on equities.   
Over the time window 1980-2010, however, Dimson et al. (2011) find that  the 
annualized real total return on US government bonds was equal to 6%, barely below the 6.3% 
earned by equities; similar results hold in the UK, where the annualized return on government 
bonds was 6.3%. Over the 1986-2010 investment horizon, the average realized equity risk 
premium was even negative, -0.8%, considering bond and equity portfolios returns in dollars 
of 19 advanced countries (0.9% in the USA and 1% in the UK; Table 1).6 Average returns 
between the two classes of financial instruments converged during a period of disinflation at 
first and of a stable and low inflation thereafter. This set of events raised considerably bond 
total real returns, because of falling nominal interest rates in the early period and hedging 
                                                            
4 In the Italian case, not even a forty years holding period would be associated with a positive real return 
(Mediobanca 2009). 
5 The Irish Government Green Paper on Pensions, issued in 2007, reports assumed nominal equity risk premium 
estimates going from a lower bound of 4.5% to 7% (Stewart 2011).  
6 The weights to combine national performances are domestic market capitalization for equities and GDP for 




properties against deflation subsequently, and of opportunities for portfolio diversification in 
a period with several stock market crises. 
These findings differ dramatically from secular trends but cannot be easily dismissed 
invoking an eventual mean reversion, because they were computed over an holding period of 
quarter of century, long enough to be relevant for the investment strategy of a new subscriber 
to a pension fund. They therefore raise doubts about the validity of a life cycle rule of thumb 
for portfolio allocation: an all-equity investment strategy does not appear worthwhile, even in 
the early stages of a worker’s career, compared to a safer all-bonds. In addition, and more 
fundamentally, they question  the traditional and stronger rationale for subscribing to private 
DC pension funds, instead of relying only on public pension schemes (with the added 
benefits of economies of scale in transaction costs compared to smaller private funds). 
Against the backdrop of a required protracted fiscal consolidation for most advanced 
countries, as a shield against markets’ doubts on looming sovereign risks because of the 
public debt to GDP ratio increase since the subprime crisis, tax expenditures aimed at 
boosting the membership in private pension funds, with implied  losses in fiscal revenues, 
should therefore be closely assessed as to their effective social net benefits.  
V. PENSION FUNDS AS LONG TERM INVESTORS IN REAL ASSETS 
Unsustainable public debt dynamics can be counteracted through GDP growth. To 
this end, run-proof private DC pension funds could be picked by policymakers as growth-
enhancing long term finance providers, especially when in the accumulation phase, as it 
happens for funds started in  Sweden and Italy at the end of last century. Growth-enhancing 
finance could mean either direct investment – in firms’ controlling rights acquisitions or in 
project financing of infrastructures or in real estate - or delegated investment through 
mandates to private equity funds and start-up and other venture capital specialists. Compared 
to banks and other institutional investors, with short term liabilities, up to the extreme case of 
sight deposits, unleveraged pension funds could commit resources on long-term, investment, 
better able to incorporate technical progress and thus enhance total factor productivity, for 
reasons similar to those spelt out in  the literature debating on long-sighted bank-centric 
systems vs short-sighted market-centric ones (e.g. von Thadden 1995).  
A scarcity of specialized operators and thin  capital market segments are likely 
however to make it difficult in most countries to pursue the option of delegated investment, 




funds collection and portfolio strategic allocation, and the task of delegated investors 
(agents), who should choose  how to manage funds under each investment line with own 
return-risk characteristics.  
A direct investment option for portfolio allocation, when combined with an 
investment  home bias, either because of regulatory or political constraints, so to restrict the 
geographical asset diversification of pension funds, would amplify the likelihood of pressures 
on policymakers to divert funds to help firms or sectors in troubles. The likely consequences 
of disregarding a proper economic assessment of the profitability prospects on the 
accumulation of the final assets to annuatize would therefore justify potential requests by 
eligible pensioners for future compensatory public funds.  
 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL EDUCATION FROM A 
MACROPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE 
To promote young workers’ participation in private pension funds adequate 
information is warranted on replacement rates with public pension schemes and on how to 
add annuities to the public retirement income.   
The often neglected implications of complex feedbacks between political risk in the 
area of pension schemes and sovereign risk, even when considering countries assumed almost 
by definition to be issuers of risk free government bonds, make it however a hard task to 
inform in a sufficiently simple way even financially literate workers.  
Against the backdrop of a protracted fiscal consolidation - meaning inter alia a 
shrinking replacement rate out of PAYG pension schemes - as a pre-requisite to fend off 
doubts on public debt sustainability in most advanced countries, a low coverage of private 
pension funds would increase the gap between (socially adequate) expected and effective 
combined retirement income. A first normative implication, that participation be mandatory, 
is likely to be however hardly implementable, exactly because fiscal consolidation means that 
the State is unlikely to be able to divert resources to ease liquidity constraints on potential 
(young) contributors. A second and more interesting implication for pension fund members, 
to be clearly focused on in financial education programs, is that non contractual life cycle 
savings should raise. A larger accumulated total wealth would help shielding a pensioner’s 




when eligible for retirement. This prescription is even more relevant when considering that a 
sober assessment of the equity risk premium should dampen the expected returns on 
contractual savings invested in DC private pension funds. Finally,  requests for fiscal outlays 
should be resisted, because the likely negative feedback loops on sovereign risk would 
compromise also the financial stability of banks and other intermediaries, through mark-to-
market losses in their holdings of government paper, with negative spillovers on the real 
economy growth. 
A medium term macroprudential conceptual framework is warranted in order to be 
effective in spelling out to even poorly financially literate workers potential endogenous 
financial risks of public and private pension schemes, in particular through the politically-
driven creation of contingent liabilities. The task of providing empirical content to this 
macroprudential perspective, admittedly requiring highly subjective, country-specific, 
hypotheses, would be a natural follow-up of the focus on pension funds’ role in financial 
stability pioneered in the September 2004 issue of  the GFSR (IMF 2004).  
Interestingly, an important contribution is research work underpinning the September 
2011 issue of the Fiscal Monitor (IMF 2011) on early warning systems on the fiscal 
sustainability risks, associated with a government’s possible inability to roll over its actual 
and contingent liabilities, following Cottarelli (2011). Baldacci et al (2011) find that, among 
twelve indicators for the Fiscal Indicators index, the third one for comparatively strong 
signaling power is the change in long-term public pension expenditure, an indicator that 
should measure budget pressures from pension expenditures7.   
Building on the conceptual map proposed in this paper, budget pressures should be 
computed in a more inclusive way, taking into account, possibly with triggering thresholds, 
contingent liabilities arising from the gap between socially accepted minimum retirement 
income and the one effectively provided combining DC public and private pension schemes, 
for different assumptions on excess returns of funds’ portfolios over government bonds. To 
make operational the proposal, the “subsistence” level could be proxied by the means-tested 
government provided age pension. In addition, a distinction should be introduced, when 
evaluating the adequacy of private savings, between countries with voluntary rather than  
mandatory private pension DC schemes.   
                                                            
7 More precisely, expressed as in percent of GDP, is the change in projected expenditures 40 years ahead 





Stress tests to assess the resilience of  bank systems to macrofinancial risks should 
consider, at least conceptually, the political risk of contingent  liabilities for the central 
government, arising from the attempt of consensus seeker policymakers to avoid that 
retirement income falls below a socially (at least in their electorate view) acceptable level. 
The likely increase in sovereign risk would impact on the capital adequacy of banks and other 
financial institutions, with negative feedback loops on the real economy. 
The main conclusions of the discussion of  the arguments supporting the claim of the 
rising importance of this specific political risk, are two. 
First, and more fundamental,  the basic message in a financial literacy initiative is that 
non contractual savings during the working age should raise, to help offsetting the effects of 
financial shocks on the final assets to annuatize.  A sober perspective on returns offered by 
the membership in DC private funds is warranted, to avoid disillusions on the standard of 
living, and consequent pressures on policymakers for remedial debt-financed fiscal outlays.. 
A necessary building block along these lines is a careful assessment of the expected equity 
risk premium.   
Second, in early warning systems on fiscal stance sustainability, budget pressures 
should take into account, possibly with triggering thresholds, contingent liabilities arising 
from the gap between socially accepted minimum retirement income and the one effectively 
provided combining DC public and private pension schemes, under different assumptions on 
excess returns of funds’ portfolios over government bonds. A promising approach to 
operationalize this conceptual framework could be to proxy the “subsistence” level with a 
means-tested government provided age pension; as for the excess returns of funds’ portfolios, 
country specific realized equity risk premia could be considered, together with required 
holding periods for realized positive real returns in equities.    
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